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Neoplatonic Influence in the Writings
of Robert Grosseteste
Robert Grosseteste was appointed the first chancellor of Oxford University in
1221. He lectured in theology there from 1225 to 1230, and became the first reader
to the Greyfriars or Franciscans in 1230. In 1235 he became the Bishop of Lincoln,
which he remained until his death in 1253.1 He wrote several treatises which contain Platonic and Neoplatonic influences, most notably De luce, on the metaphysics of light; De lineis, angulis et figuris, on mathematical reasoning in the natural
sciences; Hexaemeron, a commentary on Genesis; and Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, all written between 1228 and 1235. The Neoplatonic influences
probably come from Latin translations of Arabic commentaries on Aristotle, most
notably the al-Madina al-Fadila, or Virtuous City, of Alfarabi; and the Shifa: De
anima and Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle of Avicenna, or Ibn Sina.
Grosseteste’s first studies were probably at the cathedral school in Lincoln in
the late 1180s, after which he was active at the cathedral school of Hereford in the
1190s, which was a center for Arabic learning at the time. He then studied at Oxford from around 1199 to 1209. Grosseteste is seen by some scholars as continuing
the Neoplatonic views found in the Arabic commentaries on Aristotle, in particular
those of Avicenna. The Neoplatonic content of Avicenna’s writings was introduced to the Latin West by Dominicus Gundissalinus, who translated Avicenna’s
De anima in the twelfth century, along with the Fons Vitae of Avicebron, or Ibn
Gabirol, another source of Neoplatonic ideas. This essay will examine in particular
concepts in the Enneads of Plotinus as they are related to concepts in Grosseteste’s
writings, as they were filtered through these sources. This involves concepts of
light and matter, perception, imagination, and intellection.

Light and Matter
In De luce,2 considered the first scientific cosmology written since the Timaeus, lux, or incorporeal light, emanates into separate forms or intelligibles, and
1
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multiplies itself infinitely from a single point through rarefaction and condensation
as lumen. Light diffuses through straight lines, as in Enneads IV.6.1, into atomic
particles, as in the Timaeus, from point to line to surface to solid. As in an emanation from the One, the lux spiritualis becomes the prima forma substantialis, as
described in the Fons Vitae of Avicebron. Matter is seen as deprivation in relation
to higher forms, as in Enneads II.4.5. According to Plotinus, matter does not exist
in Intellectual Principle. Matter exists in the partial thing, without form, which is in
darkness. Darkness lies below light; light, which is Reason Principle itself, is visible to mind, in the same way that light and color are visible to the eye. Light and
color are what give things form and existence, and the matter of things lies below
light and color as being inaccessible to reason as it participates in an idea. Matter
cannot be an object of intellection, in Enneads V.9.5, because ideas are only projected onto matter, and forms in matter can only be derivatives and traces of an
original which is a product of intellection itself.
Matter is thus a recipient of the Form Ideas in intellection. The substratum of
matter is indeterminate and shapeless, while everything in intellection is determinate and has shape; thus matter cannot exist in the Intellectual Principle, or the
intellectual. There is no necessity for matter in the intellectual, because there are
no elements or compounds there, no shifting or derivatives, as in matter. Matter
has no identity nor permanence, and is in constant flux. Because it is already everything in the intellectual, there is no possibility of flux or impermanence, as described in II.4.3. The particulars of sensation are necessarily products of universals
in intellection, and universals in reason are in turn derived from the particulars of
reflected Form Ideas in sensation.
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, lux is without
dimensions but causes all spatial dimensions and change. As light emanates from
the sun, vis emanates from virtus in bodies, and intelligibles are illuminated in the
mind in the oculus interior. In the al-Madina al-Fadila of Alfarabi, active intellect
is compared to the sun, and light imprints species in the material intellect. Active
intellect transforms sense perceptions into principles, which are the first intelligible thoughts, as in Enneads I.3.5. In Enneads V.5.7, the intellectual is able to see a
light which is not an external, corporeal light, or reflected light, as in lumen. The
internal light is a lux, an incorporeal, undiffused or rarefacted light. The intelligibles, which are themselves incorporeal, are illuminated by the lux. The intellectual
is able to see both the intelligible and the light which illuminates the intelligible.
The intellectual sees without seeing; it sees light itself, not as reflected off of bodies, in a vision of an incorporeal reality. In Enneads VI.4.7, Plotinus describes the
diffusion of light. A luminous mass is at the center of a transparent sphere, illuminating the surface of the sphere. The illumination is not by any bodily magnitude
or corporeal quality. Once the light is diffused, it occupies no specific location and
can have no corporeal presence. The light is simultaneously present everywhere,
like sunlight, the presence of which is uninterrupted by the bodies it illuminates.
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For Grosseteste in De luce, light is the first corporeal form, and the cause of
all becoming of natural things. Light is corporeity itself, that which produces dimensions in matter, because material things only exist in that they are illuminated,
either by lumen in the physical world, or by lux in the mind. Grosseteste attempts
to explain the formation of the natural world by the auto-diffusion of light in mathematical and geometrical structures. Following Augustine, lux is seen as the intermediary between spirit and matter, and is that which connects mind and body.
Through lux, the mind is able to know the principia essendi, the intelligibles, as for
Plotinus. As illuminated, the principia essendi become the principia conoscendi,
the principles upon which reason is based. As principia essendi, intelligibles are
ante rem, and as principia conoscendi they are in re as particulars derived from
universals. The internal light of Plotinus is visible to the mind for Gosseteste by
the eye of the mind, the oculus mentis, which corresponds to the interior eye in
vision, which translates intelligibles to forms or species, as for Plotinus.
Grosseteste’s theory of light is influenced primarily by the account of light in
Genesis, and the Hexaemeron of Basil. In the De luce of Grosseteste, as the first
corporeal form, light is the closest thing in matter to the immaterial. The infinite
multiplication of light as lux produces a finite quantity of matter as given by light
as lumen, because lux itself is infinite. The multiplication and diffusion of light
produces a sphere, as in Plotinus, and the closer to the surface of the sphere, the
more rarefied is matter. The more the light is multiplied, the more corporeal bodies
become. Light is diffused through nine celestial spheres and four sublunary
spheres. In the process, the creative lux spiritualis becomes the uncreative reflected lumen, in the creation of both forms and intelligibles.
In the Hexaemeron of Grosseteste, light is the instrument by which bodily
sensation occurs, and by which body interacts with mind. All judgments of beauty
are made according to the principles of light, in its harmony and distribution. Light
is the instrument by which the form or species apprehended by the particular sense,
the species sensibilis, corresponds to the form apprehended in the common sense,
sensus communis, as species apprehensibilis. Imagination is the process of making
that correspondence. The species apprehensibilis is a phantasm which creates a
corresponding form in memory, as a mnemic residue. Light is the instrument by
which mind is connected to matter.
In his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Grosseteste compares the lux
spiritualis that illuminates intelligible objects in the oculus mentis to the sun which
illuminates the bodily eye and corporeal objects. The intelligible objects that are
receptive to the lux spiritualis are made visible to the oculus interior. The more
similar an object is to the lux, the more receptive it is to it, and the more it can be
apprehended by mind, which also acts as a spiritual light, in an irradiatio spiritualis. The proximity to the lux spiritualis in both perceived object and operation of
mind leads to greater clarity and certitude in thinking. The operation closest to the
lux in mind is the “first visible” in interior sight, or visus interior, just as a colored
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body is the first thing receptive of the light of the sun, though the actual first visible is the spiritual reflected light, the lumen spiritualis.
In the al-Madina al-Fadila of Alfarabi, the light of the sun is also compared to
the illumination of the active intellect, which establishes the basic principles of
thought, as in the mathematics and geometry of light of Grosseteste. According to
Alfarabi, the light of the sun enters the eye and turns potential vision into actual
vision, as potential thoughts in passive intellect are turned into actual thoughts in
active intellect. The light of the sun then renders potential colors visible, then
becomes visible itself, along with its source. The potentially intelligible thoughts
in the material or passive intellect are “sense perceptions stored in the imaginative
faculty” in al-Madina al-Fadila 200–203,3 which become intelligible through
illumination, as in Enneads I.3.5 of Plotinus.

Perception
In De lineis,4 the species, or eidos, incorporeal virtue or likeness of matter, is
transmitted by light in perception, and is reflected and doubled, and dissipated, as
in the imprint of Plotinus in Enneads I.1.7, IV.7.6, and V.3.2. According to Plotinus, the light of reason forms principles, which are the Animate, and it is in the
principle that sense perception is formed. Sense perception projects form and idea
onto matter, rather than the reverse. Perception is not capable of an “immediate
grasping of sensible objects” in I.1.7; it grasps rather the “impressions printed
upon the Animate by sensation.”5 The Animate can be seen as the imagination, and
objects can only be perceived once they have been filtered through a process of
reason. The matter of objects is inaccessible to perception and reason, as it is in
darkness and is not illuminated by the light of reason.
The impressions or imprints which are perceived are intelligibles, separate
from matter. The perception of them is a form of sensation, which is a doubling or
phantom of the act of sensation in reason itself. Perception in reason is of “Ideal
Forms,” intelligibles prior to their association with forms in matter. All sense
knowledge, discursive reason and intellection are the product of the perception in
reason of Ideal Forms. Discursive reason, in V.3.2, involves the observing, judging, combining and distinguishing of the impressions of the Ideal Forms in the
intellectual, that part of intellect inaccessible to reason, which appear as the representations imprinted in sense perception. Some of the imprinted representations
become mnemic residues, memory traces, which are absorbed and recollected, and
combined with representations in conscious thought.
3
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In Enneads IV.7.6, Plotinus distinguishes between perception and what might
be called apperception, or multiple perceptions. Actual perceptual experience is
multiple and diversified, as for Grosseteste; perceived objects have no necessary
connections in size or position, and can be perceived in a variety of ways by the
different senses. But in human perception, in reason, all objects and acts of perception are unified to form a coherent whole which structures the world around us. In
the Enneads, when the fragmented and variable objects of perception “reach the
ruling principle they will become like partless thoughts…”; they are organized in a
conceptual process through the mechanisms of language. Reason and knowledge
depend on the materials of sense experience, but are not dictated by the objects or
processes of sense perception.
The discerning of impressions printed upon the intellect by sensation for Plotinus is the function of discursive reason, not immediate sense perception. Since
the sensual impressions in perception are copies and derivatives of intelligible
forms, perception itself is a copy and derivative of reason. Reason in Plotinus is
composed of mnemic residues of perceived objects, what Plotinus calls “imprints”
in “recollections” in Enneads V.3.2. Thoughts are propelled by the desire created
by the multiple and fragmented images of perception as reconstructed in reason.
“The reasoning power in soul makes its judgment, derived from the mental images
present to it which come from sense-perception, but combining and dividing
them…,” in dialectical and discursive reason, mathematics and geometry, and
abstract concepts, in what Grosseteste will call the virtus scitiva and the virtus
intellectiva.
In Enneads IV.7.6, sense perceptions merge together in reason like “lines
coming together from the circumference of the circle,” from multiplicity to unity,
subject to the ruling principles, the archetypal, genus and species: what will be for
Grosseteste the intelligentia, divine intelligence; and what Grosseteste will call the
principia essendi and the principia conoscendi. In reality, sense objects are variable and differentiated in terms of size and location; they are multiple and fragmented, and it is only the reason of the perceiver which allows them to be apprehended as whole and congruent. Sense objects themselves cannot be immediately
perceived as a congruent whole. Once the diverse and multiple sense objects have
been transformed into a whole by apprehension in sense perception, they cannot
return to their original state, for Plotinus. Apprehension permanently transforms
sensual reality in conformance with the principles of reason.
Perception, according to Plotinus, divides, multiplies, and otherwise organizes
sensual reality; in other words, perception is an intellective process, the most basic
exercises of which are mathematics and geometry. Perceived objects are divided
and organized into parts which correspond directly to the organizational capacities
of reason. The relation of parts and subdivisions to the whole and to infinity is the
same in the sense object as it is in reasoning capacity. Geometry and mathematics
are the mechanisms by which sensual reality is represented by perception to rea-
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son, though sense objects do not inherently contain geometrical and mathematical
properties; those properties are applied to them, in the species apprehensibilis.
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, universals
(principia) exist in intellect potentially, and are activated to actuality, as in the De
anima of Aristotle the potential, material intellect, intellectus passibilis, is activated by the intellectus agens towards the active, cosmic intellect. For Grosseteste,
sense knowledge plays a role in the activation of the intellectus passibilis. In sense
knowledge a particular object is apprehended in a particular space and time, not as
the object itself but in the signification of the object as species, or eidos, as imprinted on the faculty of sense perception. The individual species sensibilis is
determined by its position in space and time, and is apprehended as an individual
signified, a sign or species rather than the thing itself, while the corresponding
species apprehensibilis, the form as understood, is not determined by a particular
space and time, and is apprehended as a collective signified: “…sensus talis est
quod ipse est apprehensivus rei alicuius signate et non est simul apprehensivus rei
alterius, quia necesse est scire rem signatum in loco signato et tempore signato,
quare non sentit nisi rem unam signatam” (I.18, 135–138).6
Sensible experience, as defined by space and time, which are intelligibles in
the virtus intellectiva, not principia essendi of the material world, is predetermined by space and time as a priori principia. Space and time do not exist
outside of thinking, intellectus; they are not qualities of the physical world, but
they determine the object as it is perceived individually, according to Grosseteste,
in sense experience, through the species apprehensibilis.
Sense perception is thus not the cause of knowledge, but rather is the condition by which knowledge is possible, as Grosseteste explains in the Commentary
on the Posterior Analytics: “Similiter neque contingit scire sensibilia neque sensus
est causa scientie, sed occasio…” (I.18, 133–134). Reason results from sense perception because reason is the apprehension of the thing signified, the species apprehensibilis in relation to the species sensibilis: “Huius autem ratio est quod sensus talis est quod ipse est apprehensivus rei alicuius signate…” (I.18, 134–136).
Reason, the virtus cogitativa or virtus scitiva, apprehends the signification or species apprehensibilis still as a singular or individual, as it is connected with material
things and determined by space and time, while the virtus intellectiva, as illuminated by the lumen spiritualis, the reflected spiritual light, of intelligentia, apprehends the signification in its totality, as universal knowledge: “et non est simul
apprehensivus rei alterius…” (I.18, 136), “cum sola demonstrabilia et universalia
sciantur…” (I.18, 164–165).
That which perceives is not contingent with that which is perceived; what is
perceived is the species sensibilis, the form of the object, not the object itself, as
determined in its singularity by the preconditions of space and time, of which the
6
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perceiver is aware in virtus cogitativa, but unaware in virtus intellectiva, as intelligentia is not wholly accessible: “…manifestum est quod non contingit sentire per
sensum.” In that what is perceived is the species sensibilis and not the object itself,
sense perception already consists of a process of abstraction, in the role of the
species apprehensibilis. As the individual sense perception is determined by space
and time, there is no possibility of immediate sense perception, or of an immediate
knowledge of objects in the physical world outside of intellection. Sense perception is a spiritual operation rather than a physical operation, as Grosseteste says in
the treatise De lineis, angulis et figuris: “In sensu enim ista virtus recepta facit
operationem spiritualem quodammodo et nobiliorem.”7
The abstractions made by sense perception are primitive in nature, confused
and relative. The species sensibilis in perception is corrupted, indeterminate, and in
flux, while the species apprehensibilis in intellectus is integrated and clear, as an
archetype or intelligible. In the Commentary on the Physics of Grosseteste (Summa
Lincolniensis Physicorum): “Racio vero diiudicat integritatem atque veras prosequitur differencias, sed sensus invenit quedam proxima et confusa veritati, accipit
vero racio integritatem. Racio…accipit vero a sensu confusam ac veri proximam
similitudinem.”8 Sense perception receives reality as multiple, undifferentiated and
incomplete, in what Plotinus saw as apperception, but the sensible object generates
the singular image of it which is perceived, the species sensibilis. Sensation and
intellection thus engage in a dialectical process involving the sense object and the
perception of it, as in Plotinus.
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, species sensibilis is apprehended without matter, as illuminated by intellectus; species apprehensibilis creates a
likeness in understanding, as in Plotinus’ Enneads V.3.2, where “reasoningprinciple in the soul,” discursive thought, “acts upon the representations standing
before it,” the species apprehensibilis, “as the result of sense perception,” the species sensibilis. For Plotinus, discursive reason approaches nous when reason recognizes its recent sense impressions and “adapts them, so to speak, to those it holds
from long before,” the mnemic residues or memory traces of previous sense impressions, in a process of reminiscence. This is also described in the Hexaemeron
of Grosseteste. The same process is described in the Theology of Aristotle, a paraphrase of the Enneads. Ratio is seen by Grosseteste in the Commentary on the
Posterior Analytics as a mirror reflecting the virtus intellectiva, as in Enneads I.1.8
and I.4.10. In Enneads I.1.8, the soul “appears to be present in the bodies by the
fact that it shines into them.” The principia conoscendi in intellect or soul become
the principia essendi of the thing or living being “not by merging into body but by
giving forth, without any change in itself, images or likenesses of itself like one
face caught by many mirrors.”
7
8
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Bodies and things in sense experience, as principia essendi, are mirror reflections of the principia conoscendi in intellect, as it is projected onto the sensible
world through sense experience. Just as in Grosseteste’s theory of vision, which
requires the combination of the intromission of light as reflected off of sensible
objects, and the extramission of light as projected from intellect, so the existence of
bodies and objects in the world requires a dialectic of their essential being and their
definition as projected onto them by intellect. This dialectic can be found again in
Plotinus. In Enneads I.4.10, ratio, or discursive reason, the lower part of the soul,
“becomes like the reflection resting on the smooth and shining surface of a mirror.”
The sense impression itself of the sensible body or object exists in intellect as a
reflection of the principia conoscendi, formed in the virtus intellectiva. There can
be no immediate sense perception of an object, without the mediation of the abstraction of the object in intellect, the formation of the species of the object, based
on prior perceptions, in the process of intellection.

Imagination
In his Hexaemeron (VIII, IV, 7),9 Grosseteste described imagination as a process which combines the sense object, and the imprint of the species of the sense
object in the senses, in intellection. The union of the species sensibilis and the
species apprehensibilis is the union of the corporeal and incorporeal, and the first
step in intellection from the passive intellect of sense peception, weighed down by
the corporeal, to the active intellect of the virtus intellectiva, freed from the corporeal. The best example of the correspondence between species sensibilis and species apprehensibilis is color, which is visible in the corporeal object and in the
oculus mentis. Because in the act of perception the color in the sense object is not
distinguished from the color in the oculus mentis, the “begetter and the begotten”
are united, the color in the sense object and in the oculus mentis, and the perceiver
is united with the sense object in the act of intellection in perception.
Through the corporeal experience of sense perception, the knowledge on the
part of the anima rationalis of the phantasmata as mnemic residues in the imaginatio of the oculus mentis is clouded or forgotten, and the anima rationalis is not
aware of the correspondence being made in intellection in the process of perception, and takes the sense perception to be immediate of the sensible object, as the
anima rationalis is weighed down by its corporeity. In the Hexaemeron (VIII, IV,
12), “Our memory, when it has received and retained a memory form [mnemic
residue], is not always actually remembering,” as it is in a state of passive intellection, tied to its corporeity. But then “when it passes from not actually remembering
to actually remembering,” that is, when it has been activated by an agent intellect
9
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in the irradiatio spiritualis, “it begets and expresses from itself the actual intellection or understanding that is in every way like to itself,” in the activity of active
intellect, virtus intellectiva. Through intellection, and the aspiration of the anima
rationalis to see clearly the intelligentia through the irradiatio spiritualis in the
oculus mentis, in the virtus intellectiva, the anima rationalis becomes aware of the
species apprehensibilis in relation to the species sensibilis in the process of perception, and it becomes aware of the relation between human intellect and the sensible
world. Intellect goes from being a functional intellect, in the gymnastics of discursive reason in the virtus scitiva or virtus cogitativa, to being a creative and generative, productive intellect in the virtus intellectiva.
The aspectus mentis is the ability of the mind to grasp ideas through the perception of visual forms, the ability of the oculus mentis to “see” the concept, the
intelligible connected with the species apprehensibilis, which is related to the
species sensibilis, in that the species sensibilis is always already a product of the
species apprehensibilis in intellection in perception. The mind sees the intelligible
in the irradiatio spiritualis of the intelligentia. Grosseteste explained in the Hexaemeron, “the species begotten in the fantasy [imaginatio] of the common sense,”
the sensus communis, “begets of itself a species that is like it in the memory”
(VIII, IV, 9), as a trace or mnemic residue, which corresponds to the presently
perceived sensible object. Perception appears to be a learned process for Grosseteste, a product of the perceiver learning how to recognize objects and relationships in relation to previously perceived objects and relationships, in order to process them in perception. Then, in the Hexaemeron, “the species that can be apprehended by the reason, intellect or understanding” (VIII, IV, 10), the species apprehensibilis, projects its likeness (similitudo) in the virtus intellectiva in the process
of perception, illuminated by the inner light, the irradiatio spiritualis, and the
mind connects the begotten likeness with the form perceived, the species sensibilis. As a result, “effective apprehension” is achieved.
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (II.6), memory receives the
species as integrated and synthesized in the sensus communis, and it receives the
intentiones connected with the species, as detected by the vis aestimativa. Memoria involves imaginatio or phantasia, the retention of the species sensibilis, and the
memoria proprie dicta, the retention of the intentiones aestimatae, in the integration of the concept formed in the virtus intellectiva to produce the species apprehensibilis. Reason is stimulated to form concepts by the memory traces, which
constitutes experience: “sed in rationabilibus iam contingit ex multis memoriis
excitata ratione fieri experientiam…” (II.6, 35–37). Memory is created from sense
experience, and universals in experience result from memory, but not as separated
from particulars: “Ex sensu igitur fit memoria, ex memoria multiplicata experimentum, ex experimento universale, quod est praeter particularia, non tamen separatum a particularibus…” (II.6, 37–39).
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The intellectus abstracts the universal idea from sense knowledge and experience, both external and internal; universals do not exist separate from particulars
or sense experience. While universals like the Platonic archetype are connected to
the particulars of sense experience, they transcend them or go beyond them in a
dialectical process in intellect, and they are the source of all particulars of sense
experience as well, as intelligibles in virtus intellectiva. In the Commentary on the
Celestial Hierarchy of Grosseteste, “Ponebant enim platonici rationes quasdam in
mente divina, aeternas, per se subsistentes, divinas, intellectuales, ad quas dicebant
omnia esse et fieri, quas et species et ideas vocabant, et tota et universalia, separatas autem a creatis omnibus, et idea dicta universalia et tota…”.10 As in the One of
Plotinus, all particulars in species and idea grow and become visible from the
universality and totality of the transcendent whole.
The relation between the universal and particular is similar to the relation
between lux, the source of light, and lumen, generated light. The universal is in the
irradiatio spiritualis in the oculus mentis, in the illumination which is the source of
the perception and cognition of particulars as phantasmata, illuminated by the
lumen spiritualis. The unity of the universal exists in the multiplicity of particulars
as the unity of lux exists in propagated light, in the Commentary on the Posterior
Analytics: “universale non est figmentum solum, sed est aliquid unum in multis”
(I.17, 121–122), and “puto quod unitas universalis in multis particularibus assimilatur unitati lucis in luce gignente et genita. Lux enim que est in sole gignit ex sua
substantia lucem in aere, nec est aliquid novum creatum ut sit lux in aere, sed lux
solis est multiplicata et propagata…” (I.17, 114–118).
The unity of the singular intelligence exists in the multiplicity of natural things
in the universe. The universal intelligence exists in particulars as the quiddity or
essential quality of particulars, through the means of the form discovered by Aristotle, so the ubiquity of the universal intelligence is the same as the existence of
the intelligence in a particular place: “universalia rerum naturalium sunt minus
entia quam singularia intelligentiarum” (I.17, 125–126), and “Si autem intelligimus universalia per modum Aristotelis formas repertas in quidditate particularium,
a quibus sunt res particulares id quod sunt, tunc universale esse ubique nihil aliud
est quam universale esse in quolibet suorum singularium” (I.18, 144–147). The
universal form or species, as the principia essendi, is in re as a particular, and ante
rem and post rem as a universal. In intellection, the irradiatio spiritualis allows the
intelligentia to exist as a quiddity or the principia essendi in the particulars of the
principia conoscendi of sense experience and virtus scitiva and cogitativa.
Species, and genus, only exist in mind, as composed of particulars in virtus
cogitativa or scitiva, and as abstracted as universals in virtus intellectiva. Universals are potential in reality, but only actual in mind. In apperception, the species is
composed of particulars, as res inventa in multitudine, and is determined by the
10
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intelligibles of space and time, which precondition all particulars of sense perception. In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, “Universale autem, cum sit res
inventa in multitudine, non est possibile sentire, quia quod reperitur in multis non
est in tempore aut loco signato, quia si esset in loco et tempore signatis non esset
idem inventum in omnibus, universale namque est semper et ubique” (I.18, 138–
142). The universal is not possible in perception, in sensible reality, because of the
multiplicity of particulars. Because the universal is always and everywhere, and no
particular place and time, that which is perceived in a signified place or time cannot be a universal. At the same time, that which is perceived in multiplicity cannot
be a particular signified place or time.
The universal concept in intellectus is derived from the memory traces of
particulars in phantasia, but at the same time the particulars of the locations in
space and time are only possible within the framework of the universal concept,
which only exists in intellectus, as illuminated by intelligentia. The particulars of
the multiplicity of apperception are always already conditions of the universal in
intellect, and there is an impossibility of there being at any moment or in any way
a particular element in sensible reality that is present in and of itself. As in the
thought of Plotinus, for Grosseteste intellectus has complete access to neither sensible reality nor the intelligibles of intelligentia, the two spheres of phenomena
which form a dialectical process on which virtus cogitativa and virtus intellectiva
are based, involving the corporeal and incorporeal.
The concept itself in intellectus is not subject to the change and variability of
particulars in sense experience, as seen in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics. The universal in concept is related to the particular in the process of inductio, where the universal is derived from the particular, and the process of abstractio, through which the principia essendi of the particular are apprehended as separate from its singularity. The principia essendi are the “unum et idem secundum
iudicium suum in multis…” (I.14, 249–250), in the dialectic of the particular and
universal, sense object and concept. The intentio animae takes the species apprehensibilis, as formed from the species sensibilis in intellectus, and balances it in a
process of iudicium; the universal is derived from the particular. The iudicium of
the intentio animae is necessary for both virtus scitiva and virtus intellectiva; science cannot be based on the particulars of sense experience alone.
In the De anima (3.7.431b, 2), Aristotle wrote that the human intellect thinks
the forms in the images, that the species sensibilis is given by the species apprehensibilis, in Grosseteste’s terms, which is formed in the imagination or phantasia
and is presented to discursive reason in the process of perception. According to
Avicenna, or Ibn Sina, in the Shifa: De anima (235),11 also known as the Metaphyisica, in the eleventh century, the image or species is formed in the sensus communis, as for Grosseteste, and is then received by the imaginative faculty, the
11
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phantasia, which combines the images in different configurations. Discursive
reason then receives an “abstraction” of the species from the phantasia, a representation of the species apprehensibilis which corresponds to the species sensibilis.
The species apprehensibilis of Grosseteste is a similitudo of the species sensiblis, as a mnemic residue, and is thus a representation of the species sensibilis,
which is itself a representation of the object to which its form corresponds. For
Grosseteste in the Hexaemeron (VIII, IX, 11), the virtus of the retentive memory
must be proportionate to the virtus intellectiva in order for the species apprehensibilis to be formed. Memory is not always active (VIII, IX, 12), but when it is active it produces a similitudo of intellection, as the ratio, the lower intellect, or
discursive reason (as in the conscious process of memory) mirrors the virtus intellectiva, the higher intellect, or nous (as in the unconscious process of memory), as
Grosseteste described in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics.
In the Enneads of Plotinus, while perception grasps the “impressions printed
upon the Animate by sensation” (I.1.7), through the mnemic residue, “nothing will
prevent a perception from being a mental image for that which is going to remember it, and the memory and the retention of the object from belonging to the imagemaking power” (IV.3.29), or the imagination (phantasia) of Grosseteste. In the
representation in the mnemic residue, the species apprehensibilis, “what was seen
is present in this when the perception is no longer there. If then the image of what
is absent is already present in this, it is already remembering, even if the presence
is only for a short time.” Through memory, “an image accompanies every intellectual act,” as described in Enneads IV.3.30. Through the species apprehensibilis,
“the intellectual act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out into the
open, but remains unobserved within…”. The species apprehensibilis functions as
a kind of hieroglyph, communicating the elements of intellect which cannot be
communicated by words, and are not accessible to discursive reason in language.
The function of language, or the extent to which language can function, is as
the mirror reflection of the virtus intellectiva in ratio, or discursive reason, in the
facilitation of memory. As Plotinus says, “the verbal expression unfolds its content
and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making power, and so shows
the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and memory of it.” The mechanism of perception mediates between the
sensible world of objects in nature and the inaccessible intellectual, or nous, in a
dialectical process between the subject and the world. There must be an “affection
which lies between the sensible and the intelligible” as Plotinus puts it, “a proportional mean somehow linking the two extremes to each other” (IV.6.1), the species
sensibilis and the species apprehensibilis. In the perception of an object, “we look
there where it is and direct our gaze where the visible object is situated in a straight
line from us…”. The object which is being perceived is already apprehended by
the perceiving subject in relation to the perceiving mechanism, the construction of
intellect involving the mnemic residue and the species apprehensibilis, through the
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use of geometry, as vision is understood in relation to geometry and mathematics,
the intelligible mechanisms as the underlying structure, as for Grosseteste.

Intellection
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, the intellectus or
nous in mind abstracts universal ideas or principia from the particulars of sense to
form principles, but intelligentia, divine or cosmic intelligence in human intellect,
functions without a corporeal agent. Logic or ratio, Plotinus’ Reason Principle, is
knowledge of the forms of material things. This is also described in the Hexaemeron, and commentaries on the Celestial Hierarchy and Mystical Theology of Pseudo-Dionysius which Grosseteste began in 1235.12
The same process is described in the distinction between active intellect and
material intellect in the Theology of Aristotle, a paraphrase of the Enneads, based
on Enneads I.3.5, V.1.3, V.9.4. Plotinus distinguishes between intellection, or
nous, and dialectic, or between Intellectual Principle and Reason Principle, between the intellectual and discursive reason, or dianoia. Intellection can be seen as
active intellect, being beyond the individual mind, and continuous and impassible,
that is, not connected to sensation, while dialectic can be seen as material intellect,
being connected to forms in matter, sensation, and individual thought processes.
While this analogy can be made, Henry Blumenthal warns against actually equating nous and dianoia with the active and passive intellects of Aristotle.13 For Alfarabi and Avicenna, active intellect is a second intelligence; for Grosseteste, it is
divine and angelic; for Thomas Aquinas, it is an agent within human thinking.
Intellection “furnishes standards” for dialectic in Enneads I.3.5, providing the
models by which dialectic operates. This idea perhaps originated with Aristotle in
the Posterior Analytics, 2.19.100b, 12, where intellect or nous is identified as the
source of the principles of thought. The term “nous” can be applied to Plotinus’
concept of intuitive intellect or the intellectual, and it can also be applied to the
concept of an active intellect in the Arabic tradition leading to Alfarabi. Through
its combining and dividing, dialectic aspires to intellection, but can only mimic it
in a degraded form as connected to sensation. In Enneads V.1.3, discursive reason
or material intellect can only be a secondary image of Intellectual Principle.
Discursive reason, or Reason Principle, is reason as enunciated or spoken, and
perceived by itself, which in Plotinus is required for perception. The intellectual,
on the other hand, is not spoken or perceived; it is unconscious reason, as it were.
The “uttered reasoning” is the logos prophorikos, while the “reason stored within”
is the logos endiathetos, in the Stoic distinction. Discursive reason is a form and
12
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derivative of intellection, and can only operate in its knowledge of the intellectual,
but it is limited by its connection to sensation. Reason in sensation for Plotinus
would be impossible without a consciousness of reason without sensation. The
intellectual being prior to reason, it is more powerful, as described in Enneads
V.9.4. The intellectual produces reason, and not vice versa, as it also produces
sensation and perception. Reason is weaker because it is also passible, being connected to sensation, and is therefore ephemeral and subject to decay, not to mention being subject to error and misunderstanding.
Ratio is seen by Grosseteste in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics as
a mirror reflecting the virtus intellectiva, as in Enneads I.1.8 and I.4.10. For Plotinus in I.1.8, intellect shines into matter and becomes present in it, as it does in
reason. Bodies in matter become living beings, but intellect does not participate in
matter or adapt to it in any way, nor is it affected by matter in any way, nor by the
operations of reason; it is only present in matter in “images or likenesses of itself
like one face caught by many mirrors.” Perception is limited and governed by the
mechanisms of intellection in reason; the perceived world conforms to what is
determined in thought. Material images are only reflections, as in Plato. The concentrated, impassible oneness of the intellectual is “unrolled and separate” in reason, and reason is “present to bodies in division,” in multiple reflections of a singular source. If reason is operating well, in Enneads I.4.10, then the mirror reflection in it of intellect is clear. If the mirror in reason is “out of gear,” that which
produces the reflection still exists, actively and unceasingly, as in active intellect,
it is just not properly reflected in the lower part of the mind. A clear reflection of
the intellectual in reason and sensation requires a state of peace and equilibrium in
mind, and it is in that state that reason becomes most like intellection, as for
Grosseteste in beatitude, in the cleansing of the lens of the oculus mentis.
In the Shifa: De anima of Avicenna, forms emanate from active intellect as
differentiated in material intellect; intelligibles are differentiated in the compositive imaginative faculty, as in Enneads IV.3.29 and IV.3.30. According to Plotinus, “every mental act is accompanied by an image,” species sensibilis, and the
mental act or thought is retained as a perceived mnemic residue in the imagination,
which allows for memory. The retention of the mnemic residue is not possible
without a conjunction between the word in the dialectic and an image, as in
IV.3.30 “memory would be the reception, into the image-making faculty, of the
verbal formula which accompanies the mental conception…,” what would be the
species apprehensibilis. The conjunction is in the intellectual, as it “never rises to
the exterior of the consciousness…”. The perceived image which is retained in the
imagination is the product of the conception of the image as Ideal Form reflected
onto matter, the conflation of species sensibilis and species apprehensibilis, but is
perceived by reason only as image, or representation.
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Conclusion
From this brief discussion, it can be seen that the philosophies of intellect and
vision of Grosseteste owe much to the Neoplatonic conceptions of Plotinus in the
Enneads, as filtered through works such as the Theology of Aristotle, Liber de
Causis, or the al-Madina al-Fadila of Alfarabi and the Shifa: De anima of Avicenna. It can also be seen that Grosseteste combines the Neoplatonic concepts with
Christian concepts from Augustine or Basil, Aristotelian and Arabic concepts, and
mystical concepts, from Pseudo-Dionysius, for example, to form a new and original philosophy, the influence of which can be seen in Renaissance Neoplatonism,
eighteenth and nineteenth-century Idealism, and in philosophies of cognition and
vision in the twentieth century.
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